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Abstract 
 
The present dissertation contains three chapters dealing with the following research questions: 
what drives dissenting (or inconsistent) voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) – the monetary policy making body in the Federal Reserve. Dissenting voting behavior 
includes disagreement among FOMC members with respect to monetary policy actions 
proposed by the chairman in FOMC meetings. Since voting protocols of such meetings are 
published dissenting voting behavior is detectable. Both scientists and practitioners use voting 
data to predict future interest rate decisions made by the FOMC. 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 examine determinants of dissenting voting behavior whereas Chapter 
3 focuses on inconsistent voting behavior.  
Firstly, Chapter 1 uses FOMC members’ voting data in the period of 1992 to 2001. The 
following results can be derived from this study: we find that individual forecasts of key 
macroeconomic variables, individual background characteristics and political determinants 
help to explain voting patterns of FOMC members. Using interaction models in an ordered 
probit framework, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, 
academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors 
are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the 
financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation 
stabilization.  
Secondly, in Chapter 2 we expand our database up to the period 1978 to 2010 and ask whether 
regional macroeconomic conditions do also explain FOMC members’ individual voting 
behavior. Using random effects ordered logit estimations, we find that FOMC members 
representing districts with high levels of regional unemployment rates are more likely to vote 
for monetary ease and less likely to vote for monetary tightening. Expanding our analysis to 
regional house price dynamics, we find that members representing districts with high regional 
house prices are more likely to vote for monetary tightening and less likely to vote for monetary 
easing. 
Thirdly, since FOMC members sometimes change their voting behavior within a meeting 
inconsistent voting is observed. Therefore, in Chapter 3 it is asked why FOMC members may 
change their interest rate preferences. Verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings between 1989 
and 2008 – provided by the staff of the Board of Governors – reveal that the Federal Reserve’s 
transparency change in 1993 significantly lowered the probability of casting inconsistent votes. 
What is more, Bank presidents (as well as female members) have a higher probability – on 
average – to cast inconsistent votes than Board members (male members). Additionally, 
individual career backgrounds and political aspects explain inconsistent votes as well. 
 
Keywords: FOMC; voting behavior; non-linear estimation techniques 
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Kurzzusammenfassung 
 
Die vorgelegte Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln und behandelt folgende 
Forschungsfragen: Was beeinflusst abweichendes (oder inkonsistentes) Abstimmungsverhalten 
im Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) – das geldpolitische Entscheidungsorgan der 
Federal Reserve. Abweichendes Abstimmungsverhalten beinhaltet Unstimmigkeiten zwischen 
FOMC Mitgliedern bezüglich geldpolitischer Handlungen, die in den FOMC Meetings vom 
jeweiligen Vorsitzenden vorgeschlagen werden. Da Abstimmungsprotokolle solcher Meetings 
publiziert werden, kann abweichendes Abstimmungsverhalten beobachtet werden. 
Wissenschaftler als auch Praktiker nutzen Abstimmungsdaten, um zukünftige 
Zinsentscheidungen des FOMC prognostizieren zu können.  
Kapitel 1 und Kapitel 2 untersuchen Determinanten des abweichenden 
Abstimmungsverhaltens, wohingegen Kapitel 3 inkonsistentes Abstimmungsverhalten in den 
Vordergrund rückt.  
Erstens, im Kapitel 1 werden Abstimmungsdaten von FOMC Mitgliedern zwischen 1992 und 
2001 betrachtet. Folgende Resultate lassen sich von dieser Studie zusammenfassen: 
Individuelle Prognosen über makroökonomische Schlüsselvariablen, individuelle 
Karrierehintergründe und politische Determinanten erklären Abstimmungsmuster von FOMC 
Mitgliedern. Mit der Hilfe von Interaktionsmodellen in einem Ordered-Probit-Modellrahmen 
zeigen wir, dass sich FOMC Mitglieder mit einem Karrierehintergrund in der Regierung, 
Industrie, Wissenschaft, Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs) oder als Mitarbeiter im Stab 
des Board of Governors eher auf die Stabilisierung des Outputs konzentrieren, während FOMC 
Mitglieder mit einem Karrierehintergrund im Finanzsektor oder als Mitarbeiter im Stab einer 
regionalen Zentralbank eher auf die Stabilisierung der Inflation konzentrieren. 
Zweitens, im Kapitel 2 erweitern wir unsere Datenbasis auf den Abschnitt von 1978 bis 2010 
und wollen die Frage beantworten, ob regionale makroökonomische Bedingungen ebenfalls 
beim Abstimmungsverhalten von FOMC Mitgliedern eine Rolle spielen. Wir verwenden 
Random-Effects-Ordered-Logit-Modelle und schlussfolgern, dass FOMC Mitglieder, die einen 
Distrikt mit hoher regionaler Arbeitslosigkeit repräsentieren, eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit 
haben, für niedrigere Zinsen abzustimmen und eine niedrigere Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, für 
höhere Zinsen abzustimmen. Wir erweiteren die Betrachtung auf regionale Hauspreise und 
finden heraus, dass FOMC Mitglieder, die einen Distrikt mit hohen regionalen Hauspreisen 
repräsentieren eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, für höhere Zinsen abzustimmen und eine 
niedrigere Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, für niedrigere Zinsen abzustimmen. 
Drittens, da FOMC Mitglieder innerhalb eines Meetings hin und wieder die geäußerte 
Zinspräferenz ändern, lässt sich inkonsistentes Abstimmungsverhalten beobachten. 
Demzufolge wird in Kapitel 3 gefragt, warum FOMC Mitglieder ihre Zinspräferenzen ändern. 
Wortgetreue Aufzeichungen von FOMC Meetings zwischen 1989 und 2008 – bereitgestellt 
durch den Stab des Board of Governors – zeigen, dass die Transparenzänderung der Federal 
Reserve von 1993 die Wahrscheinlichkeit inkonsistenter Abstimmungen signifikant 
verringerte. Darüber hinaus haben Bankpräsidenten (als auch weibliche Mitglieder) im 
Durchschnitt eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit inkonsistent abzustimmen als Boardmitglieder 
(männliche Mitglieder). Hinzu kommt, dass individuelle Karrierehintergründe als auch 
politische Aspekte inkonsistentes Abstimmungsverhalten erklären. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: FOMC; Abstimmugsverhalten; Nicht-lineare Schätzmethoden  
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Preface 
 
Monetary policy plays a crucial role in the economic cycle since central banks are not only 
responsible for providing cash to the economy but first and foremost to pursue politically 
important goals. The most important central banks, like the Federal Reserve or the European 
Central Bank (ECB), implement certain measurements (e.g., increasing or decreasing the short 
term interest rate in question) to meet monetary policy objectives such as price stability or 
maximum employment. Nowadays, most central banks delegate responsibility of monetary 
policy decisions to committees – consisting of members with different monetary policy goals, 
professional experiences, or monetary policy preferences. Possible hetereogeneity among 
committee members might lead to different assumptions about the optimal path of monetary 
policy and, hence, to dissenting views in the implementation of monetary policy actions. In the 
case of the Federal Reserve, all members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) – 
which is the monetary policymaking body of the Federal Reserve – have the opportunity to 
assent to or to dissent from the Chairman’s or Chairwoman’s interest rate proposal in official 
meetings.  
Central bank transparency varies worldwide. In the case of the Federal Reserve, data 
availability of voting protocols is excellent as compared to other central banks like the European 
Central Bank leaving voting outcomes undisclosed up to today. Fortunately, the outcome of 
FOMC meetings has been well documented and published for many decades now. Not only 
scientists use these documents of monetary policy meetings (so called meeting minutes or 
transcripts) to identify patterns or regularities in voting behavior. Also practitioners, e.g. 
professionals working in the finance branch, usually take a deep look on FOMC voting 
protocols to derive possible future movements in monetary policy actions. Therefore, this 
dissertation concentrates on the voting behavior of the Federal Reserve and aims to detect 
empirically determinants of disssenting voting behavior of FOMC members’ interest rate 
decisions. Taken together, the literature on FOMC voting behavior, to which this dissertation 
is related, has not only highly scientific significance but also highly practical importance.  
 This thesis contains three research articles, dealing with different aspects of individual 
voting behavior of FOMC members. In a nutshell, the first paper links individual forecasts of 
key macroeconomic variables to FOMC members’ dissenting voting behavior. This paper also 
investigates how individual career concerns or political affiliations might shape monetary 
policy preferences. The second paper focuses on regional macroeconomic conditions of Federal 
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Reserve districts thereby focusing on regional house price dynamics and its impact on 
dissenting voting behavior of FOMC members. Finally, the third paper tries to uncover 
determinants of inconsistent voting behavior – defined as FOMC members’ switching interest 
rate preference between the two voting stages within a meeting. This paper mainly focuses on 
the Federal Reserve’s transparency change in 1993.  
Chapter 1 called: Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy 
preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political 
aspects is joint work with Stefan Eichler and has been published in Public Choice. This chapter 
focuses on invidual forecasts of key macroeconomic variables, individual background 
characteristics and political determinants to explain voting patterns of FOMC members. One of 
our main contributions to the literature is to investigate possible moderating effects shaping 
dissenting voting behavior of individual FOMC members. In particular, using data from 1992 
to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting 
dissenting votes in the FOMC. Voting records are used to derive individual interest rate 
preferences including a preference to vote in line with the committee majority’s interest rate 
decision (coded as 0), dissents from the consensus decision in favor of monetary tightening 
(indicating a higher preferred interest rate, coded as +1), or dissents from the consensus decision 
in favor of monetary easing (indicating a lower preferred interest rate, coded as –1). Employing 
ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the 
probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual 
unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that 
FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output 
stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs 
of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find 
evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on 
inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton 
administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members 
for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the 
administrations of both George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively. 
 Chapter 2 contains the paper called: Regional house price dynamics and voting 
behavior in the FOMC which is also joint work with Stefan Eichler and which has been 
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published in Economic Inquiry. In this paper we take a deeper look on FOMC members’ 
regional affiliation. Every FOMC member is more or less affiliated to a district he/she 
represents in the committee. Regional affiliation of Federal Reserve Bank presidents is assumed 
to be stronger than for members of the Board Governors being located in Washington D.C. 
Literature on FOMC voting finds dissenting voting behavior attributed to different regional 
economic conditions. In particular, FOMC members facing high levels of unemployment rates 
in their districts are more likely to vote for lower interest rates (e.g., Meade and Sheets 2005; 
Chappell et al. 2008). We extend this analysis by focussing on regional house price dynamics. 
From a theoretical point of view, it is a priori not clear if central banks should react to asset 
prices such as house prices. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) share the view 
that central bankers should only focus on stabilizing inflation and output. However, it might be 
reasonable to incorporate asset prices in a monetary policy framework. It seems plausible to 
avoid the building-up of extreme asset price bubbles since bursting of these bubbles may have 
a severe impact on the economy. Hence, it remains an empirical question if monetary 
policymakers take house prices into account. This paper examines the impact of house price 
gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the FOMC from 1978 to 2010. 
Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap 
significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC 
casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results 
suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than 
Board members do.  
Finally, Chapter 3 called: Inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC introduces a 
relatively new feature of FOMC voting behavior, namely inconsistent voting. Using word for 
word transcripts (instead of meeting minutes or statements) I am able to investigate if FOMC 
members changed their choice of the policy alternative between two stages of voting within a 
meeting. If a member indeed changed his/her interest rate preference – coded in reference to 
the Chairman’s proposal – an inconsistent vote is collected. In this paper it is asked: What are 
the drivers for monetary policy makers to change their interest rate preferences within a 
meeting? It is hypothesized that the change in transparency in 1993 as well as individual 
characteristics of FOMC members may play a significant role in inconsistent voting behavior. 
Using FOMC voting data extracted from verbatim transcripts from 1989 until 2008 results can 
be summarized as follows: The regime shift in transparency has a significant impact on the 
probability of casting inconsistent votes. After 1993, the probability of casting inconsistent 
votes decreases significantly, on average by 3.3 percentage points. FOMC members with longer 
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tenure on the committee have a lower probability of casting inconsistent votes. Further results 
suggest that Board members and Bank presidents differ significantly, with Bank presidents 
casting inconsistent votes more often than Board members do. This relation holds true for 
gender as well, with female members casting more inconsistent votes than males. In addition, 
political aspects and career backgrounds also contribute to explaining inconsistent voting 
behavior in the FOMC. Conditional effects reveal that after the change in transparency 
differences between Board members and Bank presidents remain, whereas differences between 
male and female members have diminished. Further results suggest that FOMC members with 
a career in the government sector have been strongly affected by the regime shift in 
transparency. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the monetary policy committee in the United 
States, containing seven members of the Board of Governors and five of the twelve voting 
presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks. In fact, all twelve regional Federal Reserve Bank 
presidents participate in FOMC meetings and its policy go-arounds, thereby discussing 
alternatives of monetary policy actions and voicing their individual preferences. Sometimes 
FOMC members disagree with the interest rate proposed by the chairman, expressed by 
dissenting votes in the policy go-around, or dissents in the formal vote (i.e., when FOMC 
members prefer higher or lower short-term interest rates than proposed by the chairman of the 
FOMC).1 In this paper I focus on one specific feature of FOMC voting behavior, namely 
inconsistent voting behavior – defined as switching preference on the short-term interest rate, 
as voiced by FOMC members in their meetings. In particular, inconsistent voting behavior 
occurs if a member shows disagreement on the interest rate proposed by the chairman in the 
policy go-around, but this member agrees in the formal vote.2   
 
In the sense of inconsistent voting behavior, committee member’s formal dissenting 
votes were hold back which may offset possible positive aspects of revealing dissenting votes. 
Some researchers find desirable effects if committees publish revealed individual voting 
preferences. For instance, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2014) show in 
their papers that dissenting votes improve the predictability of future interest rate changes in 
monetary policy committees such as the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC), the Swedish Riksbank, or the FOMC. Interestingly, Meade (2005) finds that after 
committee discussions the proposed interest rate (by Alan Greenspan) was nearly always 
adopted by the committee, whereby the official dissent rate was quite low, but at the same time 
the disagreement in the policy go-around was quite high (7.5% vs. 30%).3 Thus, considering 
inconsistent voting behavior may increase the understanding of monetary policy preferences of 
                                                 
1 Some studies conclude that disagreement about monetary policy may have significant implications, e.g., for the 
returns to and volatility of financial markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a, 2007b; Blinder et al. 2008; Hayo et 
al. 2012; Neuenkirch 2012). 
2  In FOMC meetings, the second round of discussion is dedicated to discuss the Chairman’s and other 
members‘policy preferences – the so called policy go-around. Before this discussion takes place, the Board’s staff 
presents different policy alternatives. After policy preferences were shared, the FOMC takes the vote on the 
monteray policy decision. 
3 In her dataset, there was only one meeting (October, 2nd 1990) where Greenspan’s proposal – made in the policy 
go-around – was not realized in the official vote. However, voting members‘ dissenting or assenting stances 
(relative to Greenspan’s interest rate proposals) remain at both voting stages of this meeting. 
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individual FOMC voting members, and, hence, improve the information set available to 
monetary policy forecasters. 
 
Only a few papers have examined possible sources of a switching voting behavior in the 
FOMC, focusing on the shift in transparency of 1993. Before this shift in transparency, the staff 
of the Board of Governors had taped the meetings in order to prepare the minutes to be 
published after the meetings. Most members believed that these tapes were recorded over for 
the purpose of recording the subsequent meeting. However, before overwriting the existing data 
the Board’s staff prepared verbatim transcripts of the past meetings, an instance which was 
unknown to all committee members including Greenspan (Hansen et al. 2014 p. 9). Due to 
pressure exerted by U.S. Congress in order to foster monetary policy transparency, the FOMC 
decided to publish these lightly edited verbatim transcripts of its (past and future) discussions 
with a lag of five years (Swank et al. 2008 p. 481).  
 
This shift in the FOMC fits with the general trend toward increased transparency of 
developed countries’ central banks in recent decades. Through this trend market participants 
may have a better understanding of central banks’ monetary policy goals and preferences, 
leading theoretically to reduced inflation rates by reducing uncertainty.4 In addition, it is widely 
accepted that increased transparency may lead to an increase in the accountability of (monetary) 
policymakers (Hansen et al. 2014).5 Holmström (1999) underscores this “discipline”-effect of 
policymakers in his career concerns model. A positive effect of the transparency change in 1993 
is found by Hansen et al. (2014) by making use of computational linguistic models to study the 
impact of the transparency shift on FOMC debates. Borrowing from the career concerns 
literature, they find evidence for a marginally positive net effect between the discipline and 
conformity effect.6  
 
                                                 
4  Ehrmann et al. (2012) use panal data to investigate the impact of higher transparency and central bank 
communication on the forecast dispersion of economic agents. They find that increased transparency lowers 
dispersion among professional forecasters; however, the effect becomes smaller in already highly transparent 
central banks. 
5  “A strong commitment to transparency imposes self-discipline on policymakers. It ensures that their policy 
decisions and explanations are consistent over time. Faciliating public scrutiny of monetary policy actions 
enhances the incentives for the decision making bodies to fulfill their mandates in the best possible manner.” 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html 
6 For more details of the discusssion in terms of pros and cons of higher transparency see, e.g., Hansen et al. (2014). 
They hypothesize that higher transparency may have a (beneficial) discipline and/or (detrimental) conformity 
effect on policymakers. 
18 
 
Some researchers, however, emphasize possible drawbacks of increased transparency, 
especially in the FOMC after 1993 when FOMC members become aware that verbatim 
transcripts would be released with a 5-year lag. As Greenspan (1993) stated: “A considerable 
amount of free discussion and probing questioning by the participants of each other and of key 
FOMC staff members take place. In the wide-ranging debate, new ideas are often tested, many 
of which are rejected … The prevailing views of many participants change as evidence and 
insights emerge. This process has proven to be a very effective procedure for gaining a 
consensus … It could not function effectively if participants had to be concerned that their half-
thought-through, but nonetheless potentially valuable, notions would soon be made public. I 
fear in such a situation the public record would be a sterile set of bland pronouncements scarcely 
capturing the necessary debates which are required of monetary policymaking.”  
 
Meade and Stasavage (2008) find theoretical and empirical evidence for a decline in 
dissenting voting behavior of FOMC members after 1993 in the Greenspan era. In their study, 
official votes and verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings between 1989 and 1997 are used to 
support their analyses. Further papers also find empirical evidence of changing voting behavior 
after 1993 (see, e.g., Eichler and Lähner 2014a; Eichler and Lähner 2014b). However, these 
papers solely use dissenting votes cast in the formal voting. Swank et al. (2008) show in a 
theoretical framework, that once the committee reaches a decision, members tend to speak with 
one voice to the public. They state that the regime shift in transparency in 1993 led the FOMC 
to conduct pre-meetings, which, in turn, resulted in more scripted formal meetings.    
 
Following Meade and Stasavage (2008), inconsistent voting behavior is defined as a 
change in preference on the preferred interest rate voiced in the policy go-around relative to the 
interest rate preference cast in the formal voting. That is, a member who showed disagreement 
on the interest rate proposed by Chairman Greenspan in the policy debate, but agreed in the 
formal vote, is considered to have cast an inconsistent vote (coded as 1). As well, in their study 
voicing agreement in the policy go-around but dissenting in the formal vote has also been 
defined as an inconsistent vote. 7  In contrast to this, consistent voting includes cases of 
                                                 
7 In contrast to Meade and Stasavage (2008), I solely use events where FOMC members voiced disagreement in 
the policy go-around but assented in the official vote (to measure the united front assumption more appropriate). 
One may also define inconsistent voting behavior as a committee member agreeing in the policy go-around and 
dissenting in the formal vote. However, in the period examined this case did not occur with respect to the short-
term interest rate proposal. Voicing agreement in the policy go-around but dissenting in the formal vote only 
occurred when Greenspan’s proposal on the policy bias or tilt was considered. These cases were excluded from 
the analysis.  
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dissenting votes in both the policy go-around and in the formal vote, and instance of agreement 
in both the policy go-around and in the formal vote (coded as 0).8  
 
One could expect that the occurrence of inconsistent voting behavior would have 
decreased after the regime shift in transparency due to the formation of a united front to present 
to the public (that is, that the entire committee would speak with one voice), the existence of 
pre-meetings and, hence, the increase in scripted formal FOMC meetings. Former Governor 
Larry Meyer (2004) states that pre-meetings conducted by the Board of Governors actually took 
place. He characterizes the pre-boardmeetings as a place of real exchange of ideas and 
consensus seeking among Board members: “Unlike the FOMC meeting the next day, the 
discussions at the Monday Board meeting did not consist of prepackaged presentations. They 
were a much truer give-and-take, a serious exchange of ideas, with each of us questioning one 
another along the way. I often used the pre-FOMC Monday Board meetings as an opportunity 
to engage the Chairman in a discussion of the outlook and monetary policy, as I had previously 
done in the individual meetings. While we may not have always explicitly voiced our support 
of his policy recommendation at the end of the individual meetings, and later, at the end of the 
pre-FOMC Monday Board meetings, there was, in my view, an implicit commitment to support 
the Chairman the next day. Of course, if you were not prepared to support the Chairman at the 
FOMC meeting the next day, you had the obligation to tell him so at the Monday Board 
meeting.” 9 Meade and Stasavage (2008 p. 4) state that after 1993 FOMC members tend “(…) 
to present the sort of pre-pared statements that may result in less real deliberation.” However, 
the latter study finds that switching voting behavior was barely affected by the transparency 
change of 1993. Using records of FOMC transcripts over the period between 1989 and 1997, 
Swank et al. (2008) show some suggestive evidence that switching voting behavior declined 
after 1993.  
 
This paper aims to offer a deeper insight in inconsistent voting in the FOMC through 
incorporating unconditional and conditional channels in order to analyze possible member 
                                                 
8 One might think that inconsistent voting has been affected by the musical chair phenomenon saying that the 
number of dissents was implicitly constrained in FOMC meetings under Chairman Greenspan, and that the voting 
order may matter. Indeed, Gerlach-Kristen and Meade (2010) find that the higher the number of total dissents 
already cast the lower the probability of further dissents. However, the impact of the musical chair phenomenon 
in this study is limited since I focus on instances of switching from disagreement in the informal voting stage to 
agreement in the formal voting stage. In addition, data show that only 7% of inconsistent votes have been made in 
meetings with more than two formal dissents. Most inconsistent votes have been made in meetings with no formal 
dissent (48%). 
9 As reported in Cieslak et al. (2016 p. 21). 
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specific factors – in addition to institutional features such as the regime shift in transparency in 
1993. So far, the literature on FOMC voting uses such member-related characteristics to explain 
dissenting voting behavior but not inconsistent voting behavior. More specifically, I use data 
on voiced disagreement in the policy go-around released in verbatim transcripts as well as 
dissents cast in the formal voting from 1989 to 2008, expanding noticeably the time span used 
in Meade and Stasavage (2008). Second, I am able to detect further individual characteristics 
(e.g., career backgrounds or gender), which may also contribute to our understanding of 
inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC. For example, Eichler and Lähner (2014b) find that, 
when dissenting on the chairman’s formal interest rate proposal, FOMC members with career 
backgrounds in government tend to prefer easier monetary policy, whereas FOMC members 
with a career in the financial sector tend to prefer tighter monetary policy. As far as reputational 
concerns are considered, Meade and Stasavage (2008) find that experience gathered in FOMC 
meetings has no impact on inconsistent voting behavior. Following Meade and Stasavage 
(2008), reputational aspects are, of course, included in the analysis.10 Surprisingly, gender 
issues in the FOMC have thus far barely been examined. However, Chappell and McGregor 
(2000) find that female FOMC members tend to prefer easier monetary policy than male 
members do. Since this study focuses on inconsistent voting behavior, the question as to 
whether there are voting patterns related to differences in consensus building preferences 
amongst male and female FOMC members remains to be examined.11  
 
Third, as FOMC members may have different political affiliations (e.g., through the 
appointment channel), or may have been the object of political pressure from the current 
administration, political considerations must be included in the analysis. Political 
considerations in monetary policy committees are examined for instance in Havrilesky and 
Gildea (1992, 1995), Chappell et al. (1993, 1995), Tootell (1996), Meade and Sheets (2005), 
Harris and Spencer (2009) and Harris et al. (2011). For instance, Chappell et al. (1993, 1995) 
show that Board members with a Democratic affiliation tend to prefer an easier monetary policy 
stance whereas Board members with a Republican affiliation tend to prefer a tighter monetary 
policy stance. A similar voting pattern is detected in the case of the incumbent administration 
                                                 
10 Sibert (2003) show in a theoretical model that institutional characteristics of central banks (e.g., wether or not 
delayed individual votes are published) may have different effects on the incentive to building up reputation for 
junior and senior policy makers.  
11 However, literature on consensus building activity in other U.S. political institutions (e.g., Congress, or Senate) 
show empirical evidence for differences of male and female lawmakers. Many studies find that male and female 
lawmakers use different political approaches, with men being more competitive and individualistic, and women 
being more consensus oriented and collaborative (Rinehart 1991; Thomas 1994; Duerst-Lahti 2002; Jeydel and 
Taylor 2003; Volden et al. 2013). 
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(Chappel et al. 1993). Thus, it is rational to assume that political pressure exerted by the current 
administration could have an impact on consensus building tendencies in committees like the 
FOMC, especially given the fact that the majority of the FOMC (7 out of 12 FOMC monetary 
policymakers are members of the Board of Governors) is elected by the U.S. President and 
confirmed by the Senate.  
 
Finally, detecting unconditional channels of inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC 
(such as the regime shift in 1993, or being either Board member or Bank president) raises the 
question of examining possible conditional channels, e.g., how the regime shift in transparency 
may shape individual characteristics conditional on the probability of casting inconsistent votes 
(i.e., if there are significant differences between Board members and Bank presidents before 
1993, do they still appear after the transparency change or not).   
 
To sum up, these advancements lead us to the following research questions: i) Does 
higher transparency have an (unconditional) impact on the probability of casting inconsistent 
votes? ii) Do Board members and Bank presidents (and analogously, male and female FOMC 
members) differ in their likelihood of casting inconsistent votes? 12  iii) Do individual career 
backgrounds, individual experience gathered in FOMC meetings, or political considerations 
have an impact on inconsistent voting behavior? iv) To which extent are conditional effects at 
work when comparing the periods before and after the regime shift? To answer these questions, 
I use FOMC’s transcript voting data as revealed in the policy go-around and in the formal vote 
between 1989 and 2008.  
 
Results show clear empirical evidence of a decline in the probability of inconsistent 
voting by FOMC members after 1993’s shift in transparency. In particular, the probability of 
casting an inconsistent vote in the FOMC decreased on average by 3.3 percentage points. 
Further results indicate that, in general, Bank presidents have a higher probability of casting 
inconsistent votes, whereas Board members tend to vote in line with their interest preference 
voiced in the policy go-around. Taking the regime shift of transparency into account, I find that 
                                                 
12 There are several papers exploring different voting behavior of (voting and non-voting) Bank presidents and 
Board members. Sources of these different views may be the regional affiliation or availability of regional 
information (see, e.g., Belden 1989; Gildea 1990; Tootell 2000; Meade and Sheets 2005; Chappell et al. 2005, 
2008; Meade 2010; Hayo and Neuenkirch 2013; Eichler and Lähner 2014a), institutional factors such as the power 
of the chairman as well as individual preferences of FOMC members (Allen et al. 1997; Chappell et al. 1997, 
Chappell and McGregor 2000; Chappell et al. 2007a, 2007b, 2012), or monetary policy committee members’ 
individual forecasts on inflation, real GDP growth or the unemployment rate (see, e.g., Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 
2008; Banternghansa and McCracken 2009; Harris and Spencer 2009; Harris et al. 2011; Tillmann 2011).  
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Bank presidents’ probability of casting an inconsistent vote is 7.8 percentage points higher than 
the probability for Board members in the pre-1993 period, and 4.5 percentage points higher in 
the post-1993 period. Female FOMC members do also have a significantly higher probability 
of casting inconsistent votes than male ones. Interestingly, the probability for female FOMC 
members dropped sharply (by 31.6 percentage points), converging with their male counterparts 
after 1993. Further results indicate that members with longer experience in the FOMC have a 
lower probability of voting inconsistently. What is more, members with a career background in 
the industrial sector (and NGOs) have a significantly lower probability of casting inconsistent 
votes. Other career backgrounds seem to have no direct impact on inconsistent voting behavior, 
taking the entire period of this study into account. However, by applying interaction models the 
study shows that FOMC members with a career in the government sector (relative to the mean 
of the committee) have a significantly lower probability of casting inconsistent votes in the 
FOMC after 1993, and this effect is more pronounced the longer a FOMC member has served 
in the government sector.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides some 
descriptive evidence about inconsistent voting in the FOMC. Section 3.3 contains data 
description and hypotheses in the first part, whereas the second part of Section 3.3 is dedicated 
to presenting the regression analysis containing baseline regressions, robustness checks, and 
interaction models. Finally, Section 3.4 gives a short summary. 
 
3.2. Descriptive evidence  
 
As already outlined, this paper uses transcripts of FOMC meetings – released after a lag of 5 
years – containing verbatim records of FOMC members. These transcripts have been used in 
several papers investigating the determinants of disagreement within the FOMC (see, e.g., 
Edison and Marquez 1998; Meade 2005; Thornton 2005; Chappell et al. 2007b; Chappell et al. 
2008). In addition, transcripts provide some advantages over meeting minutes (Meade 2005): 
 Transcripts provide information about “true” policy preferences (e.g., output 
stabilization vs. inflation stabilization) as voiced in the policy go-arounds. Thus, 
opinions rather than votes can be collected from these documents. Additionally, 
explicit values of preferred interest changes are (with some exceptions) mentioned 
by meeting participants when they discuss policy alternatives. For example, 
transcripts contain information not only about the preferred direction of change 
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(tightening versus easing), but also about the magnitude (+/- 25 (50, 75, 100, etc.) 
basis points). 
 Meeting minutes contain only information about the formal vote of each member 
(dissenting or assenting). Thus, minutes signal strong individual deviations from the 
interest rate proposed by the chairman. Transcripts provide information about the 
entire continuum of disagreement.  
 Transcripts contain verbatim information about Board members and voting and non-
voting Bank presidents, whereas the minutes only reveal information about voting 
members.13  
 
FOMC meetings usually have a clear structure, although there were some minor 
differences under the chairmanships of Greenspan and Bernanke. In general, FOMC meetings 
contain two rounds of discussions published in FOMC transcripts. In the first round, FOMC 
members expressed their views on economic conditions (with regional Bank presidents 
providing further information about their districts), whereas the second round was dedicated to 
discussing policy options (after the staff of the Board presents its Blue Book). In the second 
round of deliberations, Alan Greenspan typically spoke first giving a summary of the prior 
discussion and a policy recommendation to debate on (other participants followed including 
Governors, as well as voting and non-voting Bank presidents), while Bernanke provided a 
summary of discussion and a policy recommendation at the beginning or at the end of the policy 
go-around.14 After the second round of discussion the official vote was taken, in which the 
chairman votes first, thereby proposing the monetary policy action. Since FOMC members 
voiced their individual preferences on the policy issue in the policy go-around (the second round 
of discussion) and were voting shortly afterwards (the formal vote), it is possible to construct a 
binominal voting indicator measuring (in)consistent voting behavior. An inconsistent vote is 
recorded if: a) FOMC member voiced disagreement (e.g., preferring an alternative policy option 
with respect to the chairman’s position) in the second round of discussion, and if b) the same 
member casts an assent in the official vote. When both conditions are fulfilled by the same 
member, the member has voted inconsistently (coded as 1; 0 otherwise). Table 3.1 shows all 
inconsistent votes contained in the dataset. In the period between 1989 and 2008, 94 
                                                 
13 The Federal Reserve system is based on a rotating voting scheme. Whereas all Bank presidents attend FOMC 
meetings, only five out of twelve Bank presidents have a voting right with the New York Fed president as a 
permanent voter. 
14 A dummy variable – Greenspan – is included in the regression analysis to control for potential patterns in 
inconsistent voting behavior of FOMC members under the different chairmanships of Alan Greenspan and Ben 
Bernanke. 
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inconsistent votes out of 1796 total votes were recorded (5.2% of all votes cast). Bank 
presidents change their views on the monetary policy stance more frequently than Board 
members do (59 vs. 35 inconsistent votes, indicating a share of 7.3% of all votes cast by Bank 
presidents and 3.6% of all votes cast by Board members).  
 
 From 1989 until October 199315 there were 37 meetings with 30 inconsistent votes being 
recorded (a share of 0.81 inconsistent votes per meeting, or 7.1% of total votes), and from 
November, 1993 to the end of 2008 they were 128 meetings with 64 recorded inconsistent votes 
(a share of 0.5 inconsistent votes per meeting, or 4.5% of total votes). Taking Board members 
and Bank presidents into account, the descriptive evidence reveals that until the regime shift a 
Board member cast an inconsistent vote, in average, 0.35 times per meeting (or 5.4% of total 
votes cast by Board members), whereas a Bank president cast an inconsistent vote, on average, 
0.46 times per meeting (or 9.4% of total votes cast by Bank presidents). After the regime shift 
these numbers drop to 0.17 times per meeting (or 3.0% of total votes) for Board members and 
to 0.33 times per meeting (or 6.6% of total votes) for Bank presidents. Female FOMC members 
changed their views, in total, 21 times (or 8.9% of total votes cast by female members), while 
male FOMC members changed their views 73 times (or 4.7% of total votes cast by male 
members).  
 
To sum up, the descriptive evidence reveals that the regime shift in transparency in 1993 
may have had an impact on inconsistent voting behavior, leading to a lower probability of 
inconsistent voting in the FOMC. What is more, Board members and Bank presidents seem to 
have different voting patterns, with Bank presidents casting inconsistent votes more often, 
regardless of the time period considered. However, such descriptive evidence is typically not 
sufficient to prove the hypotheses since there are several potential factors, such as career 
background characteristics or political affiliations that may also affect inconsistent voting 
behavior. Hence, a regression approach is presented below using pooled, random effects and 
rare events logit models to provide empirical evidence. To examine potential conditional effects 
of the regime shift, interaction terms are included in the regression analysis as well. 
  
 
 
                                                 
15 Meade and Sheets (2005) date the November meeting of 1993 as the very first meeting of the regime shift. 
25 
 
TABLE 3.1: STYLIZED FACTS OF INCONSISTENT VOTING BEHAVIOR FROM 1989 TO 2008 
 Board Bank Sum 
 Male Female Male  Female  
1989 1 1 6  8 
1990  3 1  4 
1991   4  4 
1992 3 4 6  13 
October 1993  1   1 
November 1993 3  1  4 
1994 4 2 5  11 
1995 2 2 5 2 11 
1997 1  5  6 
1998 1  2 3 6 
2000 1  5  6 
2001 2  5 1 8 
2003 1 1 2  4 
2007 1  2  3 
2008  1 4  5 
Sum 20 15 53 6 94 
Note: Years with no inconsistent votes were dropped from the table. 
3.3. Regression analysis  
 
3.3.1. Data and hypotheses 
 
In addition to the variables of interest, i.e. before and after the regime shift (Tape), whether one 
is a Board member or Bank president (Board member), individual career backgrounds 
(Academia, Government, Industry, Finance, NGO, Board staff, Fed bank staff), political 
affiliations (Dem governor, Rep Governor, Dem bank president, Rep bank president, 
President’s party), gender (Gender), and gathered committee experience (Experience), the 
dataset contains, in line with the previous literature on FOMC voting behavior, several 
additional control variables listed in Table A 3.1 in the Appendix. To provide robustness to the 
presented results, institutional characteristics (represented by the dummies Meeting and 
Greenspan) of the FOMC; national macroeconomic conditions (namely the National industrial 
production gap, the National inflation, the National output gap, the National unemployment, 
the National house price gap, the Federal funds rate, the National exchange rate index, and the 
National commodity price index); and regional macroeconomic conditions (namely Regional 
house price gap, Regional unemployment, Failed deposits of regional banks, and Regional 
26 
 
coincident index) are included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A 3.2. 
These institutional characteristics, national macroeconomic conditions, and regional conditions 
may have a systematic influence on inconsistent voting behavior, although the expected signs 
were not clear a priori. 
 
 Nevertheless, some hypotheses can be drawn from the literature and from the descriptive 
evidence provided in the Introduction Section and in Section 3.2. Generally, literature shows 
some contradicting effects of the shift in transparency in 1993 on the debating environment in 
the FOMC. However, in the case of inconsistent voting this study is rather related to Meade and 
Stasavage (2008) finding negative outcomes in terms of voting behavior. The transparency 
effect – represented by the dummy Tape in the regression analysis – is assumed to decrease the 
probability of casting inconsistent votes. In more detail, after FOMC members became aware 
that verbatim transcripts would not only be kept but also be published, FOMC members 
changed their voting behavior in FOMC meetings. Meade and Stasavage (2008) provide 
empirical evidence that the probability of casting dissenting votes in the policy go-around and 
in the formal vote declined significantly after 1993. However, in the case of inconsistent votes 
the authors found only weak evidence that inconsistent voting behavior was affected by the 
transparency shift. Following the study mentioned above, a negative coefficient is predicted. 
 
What is more, because of the anecdotal evidence that during the time period in question 
the Board of Governors conducted so called pre-meetings, which may have resulted in more 
scripted formal FOMC meetings, it is assumed that Board members have a lower probability of 
casting inconsistent votes than Bank presidents do since Bank presidents do not attend those 
pre-meetings. Since the dummy variable Board member is coded as Governor = 1, Bank 
president = 0, a negative coefficient is predicted. Concerning gender, from theoretical point of 
view it is not clear a priori how male versus female FOMC members may behave in terms of 
inconsistent voting behavior in a monetary policy committee such as the FOMC.16  
 
With respect to reputational aspects, reasons of herding as well as anti-herding of 
inexperienced members can be drawn. Intuitively, at the beginning of the career in the 
committee a member may have a higher probability of changing his/her view in the formal vote 
                                                 
16 However, descriptive evidence from Section 3.2 reveals a comparatively high ratio of inconsistent votes made 
by female FOMC members. Taking this together, a positive coefficient is predicted since the dummy Gender is 
defined as female member = 1, male member = 0 indicating a higher probability of voting inconsistent for female 
members. 
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towards the interest rate proposed by the chairman, if he/she expressed a dissenting view in the 
policy go-around. This behavior could be explained by inexperienced members‘ preference of 
fostering consensus in order to avoid the status of an “outsider” in the committee and, thus, lose 
credibility right at the beginning of his/her career.17 Along this reasoning, for experienced 
members it may be easier to keep their interest rate preference in both the informal and formal 
voting stage leading to a higher probability of consistent votes. On the other hand, 
inexperienced agents have a higher motivation to improve their productivity relative to 
experienced members (Holmström 1999).18 An increase in productivity can be realized by 
members undertaking costly (due to time-spending) acquisition of information about the stance 
of the economy. To signal this information advantage, an inexperienced member may have a 
higher incentive to keep his/her dissenting view in the informal as well as in the formal vote 
leading to a lower probability of inconsistent votes in the committee. Therefore, it remains an 
empirical question which channel may have a higher impact on inconsistent voting in the 
FOMC.  
 
Finally, since this is the first paper that analyzes the impact of FOMC members’ 
individual characteristics on inconsistent voting behavior it is difficult to formulate clear 
hypotheses for either a certain career background or the political affiliation a priori.  
 
 Relating to the descriptive evidence given above some further exercises can be 
conducted in terms of conditional effects. It is supposed that the shift in transparency may not 
only have had a direct effect on the probability of casting inconsistent votes but may shape 
inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC as well, tested in interaction models. Therefore, the 
Tape dummy is interacted with the independent variables in question: Board member, Gender, 
President’s party, Experience, and career backgrounds (Academia, Government, Industry, 
Finance, NGO, Board staff, Fed bank staff). Some results of interest are provided in Section 
3.3.4. 19  
 
 
                                                 
17 Agents with career concerns show herding behavior once they face uncertainty about their own expertise (see, 
e.g., Scharfstein and Stein 1990). 
18 A rise in productivity, in our case, contains the members‘ ability to make better judgements of the stance of the 
economy. 
19 Using a diff-in-diff analysis, Hansen et al. (2014) find that inexperienced members‘ influence on policy topics 
increased after 1993. 
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3.3.2. Empirical methodology  
 
In order to test the determinants of inconsistent voting behavior I use a binominal voting 
indicator as the dependent variable. For each FOMC meeting, the transcripts published by the 
Board of Governors provide information for each member as to whether the member agreed 
with the interest rate suggestion of the chairman, dissented in favor of tightening with a higher 
preferred interest rate, or dissented in favor of easing with a lower preferred interest rate. Since 
transcripts contain both verbatim information of the second round of discussions (so called 
policy go-around) and information about the formal vote, inconsistent voting behavior is 
detectable. Following Meade and Stasavage (2008) a member voted inconsistently if a member 
showed disagreement on the interest rate proposed by the chairman in the policy go-around, but 
voted in agreement in the formal vote (coded as 1, 0 otherwise). In order to account for the 
binominal nature of the dependent variable I use standard logit models to test the hypotheses.20 
  
The empirical strategy was as follows: models I-V of Table 3.2 show the results of a 
pooled estimator for the logit models. Different variable constellations are estimated in order to 
mitigate the omitted variable bias. Model I contains a simple equation of institutional factors, 
whereas models II-V incorporates a bundle of controls. In a nutshell, model II adds political 
affiliation dummies, model III adds national and regional macroeconomic conditions, model IV 
takes professional experience measured as individual career background characteristics (instead 
of committee experience) into account. Finally, model V incorporates institutional 
characteristics of the FOMC, political affiliations and individual career background 
characteristics of FOMC members. In order to assess the economic significance of the 
independent variables on inconsistent voting behavior of FOMC members, average marginal 
effects are presented giving the discrete change in the probability of casting an inconsistent vote 
for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, ceteris paribus (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.5).  
  
Coming to the results of the baseline regressions, Table 3.2 reveals that the regression 
results confirm the hypotheses. The Tape variable – tracking the regime shift in transparency – 
is negative and highly significant in all specifications. That is, once FOMC members became 
aware that meetings were not only recorded but would be published as well, the probability of 
                                                 
20 One might think that probit models could also be appropriate. Therefore, probit models (not reported, but 
available upon request) of the baseline regressions were conducted showing similar results. In order to account for 
potential unobserved heterogeneity among Federal Reserve districts I use a random effects estimator for the logit 
models as robustness checks (see Table 3.4). 
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casting inconsistent votes decreased significantly. In other words, FOMC members changed 
their voting behavior towards consistent voting. Thus, the results confirm the hypothesis that 
after 1993 the FOMC was forced to develop a more united front to present to the public by 
speaking with one voice. This led not only to a lower probability of casting dissenting votes in 
the formal vote (which is not examined in this paper but for which evidence was found in other 
studies) but also to a lower probability of casting inconsistent votes (which is the focus of the 
present paper). In terms of economic significance and relative importance expressed by 
marginal effects, I find a decrease in the probability of casting inconsistent votes in the FOMC 
on average by 2.4 percentage points up to 3.8 percentage points after 1993.  
 
As hypothesized, the Board member dummy is negative and highly significant in all 
regressions, meaning that Board members’ probability of casting inconsistent votes is 
significantly lower than Bank presidents’ probability, with the marginal effect ranging from 4.3 
percentage points to 5.1 percentage points.  
 
Moreover, the more experienced a FOMC member the lower the probability of casting 
inconsistent votes. In other words, relatively new members tend to change their views towards 
consensus more often than “old hands” do. These results indicate that the conformity channel 
decribed in the career concerns literature outweighs the discipline channel to some extent. 
Inexperienced members tend to herd towards the Chairman, avoiding the status of “standing 
out”.  However, the economic significance remains relatively small. Gathering one more year 
of experience as a FOMC member leads to a lower probability of casting inconsistent votes by 
0.3 percentage points.  
 
FOMC members having worked in industry and NGOs before becoming a Bank 
president or Board member have a significantly lower probability of casting inconsistent votes. 
This result could be interpreted as being more resilient to the chairman’s pressure of converging 
towards the interest rate proposal by members with a career in industry or NGO which, in turn, 
might result in better job market opportunities after retiring from the position in the committee. 
More specifically, marginal effects yield that one more year of working in industry or with 
NGOs before becoming a Board member or Bank president (relative to mean of the committee) 
leads to a 0.7 percentage points and 0.5 percentage points lower probability of casting 
inconsistent votes, respectively.  
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Interestingly, the dummy Gender is positive and highly significant, i.e. female FOMC 
members change their views on the appropriate monetary policy stance towards consensus more 
often than male ones do. Hence, while many studies find higher consensus building activity by 
women in Congress or Senate, this is the first study I am aware of providing empirical evidence 
for higher consensus building activity by women in the FOMC.  
 
Finally, taking policy issues into account, the results show that the President’s party 
dummy is positive and significant, indicating a higher probability of casting inconsistent votes 
during the Clinton administration, and a lower probability of casting inconsistent votes during 
the Bush administrations. Further, Bank presidents elected during Republican presidencies 
show a significantly higher probability of casting inconsistent votes (in comparison to 
Democratic Board members).  
 
Turning to the controls, with the exception of the national inflation rate, for which the 
empirical significance is small, the results show no clear impact of either national or regional 
macroeconomic conditions. In addition, Wald chi² values of models I-V of Table 3.2 indicate 
the variable constellations are appropriate. The model fit is further assessed by using pseudo 
R², the Percentage share of Correctly Predicted cases (PCP), and the Expected Percentage share 
of Correctly Predicted cases (EPCP). 
 
TABLE 3.2: COEFFICIENTS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS USING POOLED LOGIT ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.495 ** -0.633 ** -0.799 *** -0.805 *** -0.720 *** 
  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.27)  
Meeting -0.456  -0.571  -0.124  -0.070  -0.145  
  (0.56)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.67)  
Greenspan 0.639  0.484  0.335  0.021  0.160  
  (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.57)  (0.60)  (0.61)  
Board member -1.023 ***   -1.056 *** -0.906 ***   
  (0.22)    (0.22)  (0.33)    
Experience -0.060 * -0.060 ** -0.059 *     
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)      
Gender 0.870 *** 0.946 *** 0.879 *** 0.839 *** 0.962 *** 
  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.32)  (0.32)  
President‘s party   0.465 ** 0.506 ** 0.501 ** 0.452 ** 
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    (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.23)  
Dem bank president   0.337      0.431  
   (0.43)      (0.51)  
Rep bank president    1.059 ***     1.101 ** 
   (0.40)      (0.47)  
Rep governor   -0.325      -0.118  
   (0.40)      (0.44)  
National industrial production gap     -0.241  -0.280  -0.262  
      (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  
National inflation     -0.649 * -0.693 * -0.660 * 
     (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.37)  
Regional unemplyoment     -0.212  -0.097  -0.148  
      (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.18)  
Regional house price gap     -0.046  -0.037  -0.047  
      (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Academia       0.012  0.037  
       (0.02)  (0.02)  
Government       -0.057  -0.013  
       (0.06)  (0.07)  
Industry       -0.152 *** -0.131 ** 
       (0.06)  (0.06)  
Finance       -0.025  -0.002  
       (0.02)  (0.02)  
NGO       -0.105 * -0.102 * 
       (0.06)  (0.06)  
Board staff       -0.005  0.011  
       (0.02)  (0.02)  
Fed bank staff       -0.015  0.008  
       (0.02)  (0.03)  
Constant -2.052 *** -2.735 *** -2.001 ** -2.462 *** -3.463 *** 
 (0.70)  (0.80)  (0.86)  (0.87)  (1.03)  
Pseudo R2 0.05  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.11  
Wald chi2 37.26 *** 58.59 *** 56.61 *** 68.19 *** 71.12 *** 
LogL -351.26  -346.20  -345.14  -329.39  -327.90  
PCP (%) 94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  
EPCP (%) 90.28  90.32  90.37  90.48  90.49  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Results from pooled logit model estimation. Dependent variable: inconsistent vote. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3.3: AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS USING POOLED LOGIT ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.024 ** -0.031 ** -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.034 *** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Meeting -0.022  -0.028  -0.006  -0.003  -0.007  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  
Greenspan 0.031  0.023  0.016  0.001  0.008  
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Board member -0.050 ***   -0.051 *** -0.043 ***   
  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.02)    
Experience -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 *     
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)      
Gender 0.042 *** 0.046 *** 0.042 *** 0.040 *** 0.046 *** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
President‘s party   0.022 ** 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.021 ** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Dem bank president   0.016      0.020  
   (0.02)      (0.02)  
Rep bank president    0.051 ***     0.052 ** 
   (0.02)      (0.02)  
Rep governor   -0.016      -0.006  
   (0.02)      (0.02)  
National industrial production gap     -0.012  -0.013  -0.012  
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
National inflation     -0.031 * -0.033 * -0.031 * 
      (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Regional unemployment     -0.010  -0.005  -0.007  
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Regional house price gap     -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
      (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Academia       0.001  0.002  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Government       -0.003  -0.001  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Industry       -0.007 ** -0.006 ** 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Finance       -0.001  0.000  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
NGO       -0.005 * -0.005 * 
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       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Board staff       0.000  0.001  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Fed bank staff       -0.001  0.000  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.3.3. Robustness checks of the baseline regressions 
 
In this subsection several robustness checks are presented to underscore the results of baseline 
regressions. First, a random effects estimator instead of a pooled estimator is used in the 
regressions. Table 3.4 presents the results of random effects logit estimations using the same 
specifications as in Table 3.2. The results found in Table 3.4 support the results of the baseline 
regressions. The coefficient of Tape remains negative and significant in all regressions, 
indicating that the 1993 change in transparency significantly decreased the probability of 
inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC, although the empirical and economic significance 
is slightly smaller when applying a random effects estimator. The results for Board member, 
Experience,21 Gender, President’s party, and Rep bank president are confirmed as well. In other 
words, the coefficient estimations remain robust regardless of whether pooled or random effects 
estimation techniques are used, emphasizing the robustness of the baseline results.  
 
Second, a variety of national and regional macroeconomic control variables were added 
to model III of Table 3.2. These determinants were used in many other papers dealing with 
FOMC voting behavior and may also have had a significant impact on inconsistent voting 
behavior (see Table 3.6 for coefficient estimates, and Table 3.7 for marginal effects). In more 
detail, in model I the National output gap was added; in model II the National unemployment; 
in model III the Federal funds rate; in model IV Failed deposits of regional banks and the 
Regional coincidence index; and finally in model V the National house price gap, the National 
exchange rate index, and the National commodity price index. To capture a possible change in 
inconsistent voting behavior during turmoil episodes, a time dummy – recession – is included 
                                                 
21 As an alternative specification, I replaced member’s committee experience with his/her age having also a 
negative and significant impact on inconsistent voting in the FOMC. Results are not presented here but available 
upon request. 
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in the analysis as well. 22  As the results of Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 indicate, coefficient 
estimations as well as marginal effects of the variables in question remain significant and show 
the predicted signs.  
 
Third, taking the large number of consistent votes (coded as zero) relative to the small 
number of inconsistent votes (codes as one) into account, rare events logit models are applied 
to address this issue.23 As can be seen from Table 3.8 coefficient estimates from rare events 
logit models are very similar to those from baseline regressions indicating correctly estimated 
coefficients when using standard logit estimation techniques.  
 
Finally, as “outliers” (i.e., frequent inconsistent voters) may drive the results the top two 
inconsistent voters were dropped out of the sample accounting for 19% of total inconsistent 
votes being recorded. Again, results remain the same showing highly significant and correctly 
predicted coefficients similar to those in the baseline regression presented in Table 3.2.24 
 
TABLE 3.4: COEFFICIENTS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS USING RANDOM EFFECTS LOGIT ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.544 ** -0.587 * -0.911 *** -0.767 ** -0.631 * 
  (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.33)  
Meeting -0.364  -0.485  -0.065  -0.034  -0.103  
  (0.56)  (0.56)  (0.59)  (0.59)  (0.59)  
Greenspan 0.623  0.467  0.113  -0.129  0.079  
  (0.40)  (0.46)  (0.51)  (0.54)  (0.58)  
Board member -1.318 ***   -1.388 *** -1.014 ***   
  (0.26)    (0.27)  (0.39)    
Experience -0.068 * -0.071 ** -0.069 **     
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)      
Gender 0.800 ** 0.836 ** 0.809 ** 0.344  0.517  
                                                 
22 It is well known that uncertainty about contemporary or forecast values of macroeconomic conditions increases 
during episodes of real economic recession (e.g., Bachmann et al. 2010; Bloom 2013; Jurado et al. 2013). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that during episodes of recessions decions about the appropriate monetary 
policy stance might be more difficult than in tranquil times which, as a result, could lead to a higher likelihood of 
casting inconsistent votes. 
23 Leitgoeb suggested at the 2013 European Survey Research Association (ESRA) to apply Penalized Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (PMLE) for datasets with a large number of observations and a relatively small number of 
events (in our case, events are inconsistent votes). He noticed that maximum likelihood estimates might be biased 
in cases of rare events. To overcome this possible issue, penalized maximum likelihood estimations are applied by 
using STATA’s firthlogit command (see e.g., the Firth Method, introduced by Firth (1993)). 
24 Results are not presented here but available upon request.  
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  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.48)  (0.49)  
President‘s party   0.473 * 0.539 ** 0.475 * 0.421  
    (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.28)  
Dem bank president   0.814 *     0.333  
   (0.46)      (0.57)  
Rep bank president    1.685 ***     1.442 *** 
   (0.42)      (0.56)  
Rep governor   0.048      -0.174  
   (0.44)      (0.51)  
National industrial production gap     -0.294  -0.328 * -0.314 * 
      (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  
National inflation     -0.664  -0.736 * -0.689  
     (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.44)  
Regional unemplyoment     -0.016  0.038  0.002  
      (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  
Regional house price gap     -0.071  -0.039  -0.049  
      (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Academia       0.028  0.067 ** 
       (0.02)  (0.03)  
Government       0.040  0.117  
       (0.09)  (0.10)  
Industry       -0.140 ** -0.102  
       (0.07)  (0.07)  
Finance       -0.009  0.025  
       (0.03)  (0.03)  
NGO       -0.103  -0.101  
       (0.09)  (0.09)  
Board staff       -0.009  0.022  
       (0.04)  (0.04)  
Fed bank staff       0.024  0.058  
       (0.04)  (0.04)  
Constant -2.164 *** -3.502 *** -1.835 ** -2.465 *** -3.770 *** 
 (0.78)  (0.89)  (0.87)  (0.83)  (1.02)  
Lnsigma2u -0.165  -0.108  -0.098  -0.504  -0.270  
 (0.60)  (0.61)  (0.60)  (0.77)  (0.70)  
Sigma_u 0.921  0.948  0.952  0.777  0.874  
 (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.31)  
rho 0.205  0.214  0.216  0.155  0.188  
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 27.06 *** 25.84 *** 26.38 *** 7.46 *** 10.38 *** 
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Wald chi2 32.39 *** 40.81 *** 41.80 *** 41.99 *** 46.26 *** 
Log pseudoL -337.73  -333.27  -331.95  -325.65  -322.71  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Results from random effects logit model estimation. Dependent variable: inconsistent vote. Standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.5: AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS USING RANDOM EFFECTS LOGIT 
ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.020 * -0.020  -0.034 ** -0.018  -0.013  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Meeting -0.014  -0.018  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Greenspan 0.016 * 0.012  0.003  -0.002  0.001  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Board member -0.047 ***   -0.046 *** -0.020 *   
  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.01)    
Experience -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 *     
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)      
Gender 0.034 * 0.034 * 0.032 * 0.007  0.011  
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
President‘s party   0.015  0.017 * 0.009  0.008  
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Dem bank president   0.032      0.006  
   (0.02)      (0.01)  
Rep bank president    0.076 **     0.036  
   (0.03)      (0.02)  
Rep governor   0.001      -0.003  
   (0.01)      (0.01)  
National industrial production gap     -0.009  -0.006  -0.005  
      (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
National inflation     -0.020  -0.014  -0.012  
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Regional unemplyoment     0.000  0.001  0.000  
      (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Regional house price gap     -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  
      (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Academia       0.001  0.001 * 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Government       0.001  0.002  
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       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Industry       -0.003 *** -0.002 * 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Finance       0.000  0.000  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
NGO       -0.002  -0.002  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Board staff       0.000  0.000  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
Fed bank staff       0.000  0.001  
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS USING POOLED LOGIT ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.850 *** -0.805 *** -0.702 ** -0.912 *** -0.670 ** 
  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.28)  
Meeting -0.165  -0.186  -0.091  -0.077  -0.046  
  (0.62)  (0.63)  (0.68)  (0.68)  (0.67)  
Greenspan 0.122  0.254  0.239  0.493  0.601  
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.58)  
Board member -1.057 *** -1.055 *** -1.048 *** -1.036 *** -1.036 *** 
  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  
Experience -0.059 * -0.060 * -0.058 * -0.059 * -0.056 * 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Gender 0.919 *** 0.892 *** 0.885 *** 0.859 *** 0.884 *** 
  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
President‘s party 0.617 *** 0.563 ** 0.444 * 0.433 * 0.486 ** 
  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.23)  
Recession 0.511  0.193  -0.008  -0.068  0.161  
 (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (0.34)  
National industrial production gap     -0.230  -0.217  -0.296  
      (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  
National output gap 0.347          
 (0.24)          
National unemployment    0.284        
   (0.84)        
National inflation -0.896 ** -0.707 ** -0.780 ** -0.739 ** -0.624  
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 (0.37)  (0.34)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.40)  
Federal funds rate     0.067      
     (0.06)      
National house price gap         0.015  
         (0.06)  
National exchange rate index         0.135  
         (0.12)  
National commodity price index         0.019  
         (0.02)  
Regional unemployment  -0.228  -0.218  -0.234  -0.157  -0.202  
  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  
Regional house price gap -0.064  -0.055  -0.070  -0.063    
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)    
Failed deposits of regional banks       -0.008    
       (0.01)    
Regional coincident index       0.171    
       (0.17)    
Constant -1.807 ** -1.899 ** -2.285 ** -2.029 ** -2.507 *** 
 (0.83)  (0.83)  (0.92)  (0.91)  (0.94)  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  
Wald chi2 75.97 *** 72.79 *** 70.78 *** 77.15 *** 70.18 *** 
LogL -344.83  -345.76  -344.56  -343.80  -344.04  
PCP (%) 94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  
EPCP (%) 90.36  90.35  90.38  90.38  90.38  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Results from pooled logit model estimation. Dependent variable: inconsistent vote. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 TABLE 3.7: AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS 
USING POOLED LOGIT ESTIMATOR 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.041 *** -0.039 *** -0.034 ** -0.044 *** -0.032 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Meeting -0.008  -0.009  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Greenspan 0.006  0.012  0.011  0.024  0.029  
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Board member -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Experience -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
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Gender 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 0.041 *** 0.042 *** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
President‘s party 0.030 *** 0.027 ** 0.021 * 0.021 * 0.023 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Recession 0.025  0.009  -0.000  -0.003  0.008  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
National industrial production gap     -0.011  -0.010  -0.014  
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
National output gap 0.017          
 (0.01)          
National unemployment    0.014        
   (0.04)        
National inflation -0.043 ** -0.034 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 ** -0.030  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Federal funds rate     0.003      
     (0.00)      
National house price gap         0.001  
         (0.00)  
National exchange rate index         0.006  
         (0.01)  
National commodity price index         0.001  
         (0.00)  
Regional unemployment -0.011  -0.010  -0.011  -0.008  -0.010  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Regional house price gap -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003    
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
Failed deposits of regional banks       -0.000    
       (0.00)    
Regional coincident index       0.008    
       (0.01)    
No. of Obs. 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.8: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF THE BASELINE REGRESSIONS CONSIDERING RARE EVENTS BY USING 
FIRTHLOGIT ESTIMATION 
Variable Model                   
  I  II  III  IV  V  
Tape -0.496 ** -0.626 ** -0.793 *** -0.773 *** -0.678 ** 
  (0.24)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.30)  
Meeting -0.548  -0.657  -0.207  -0.160  -0.232  
  (0.38)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.55)  (0.56)  
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Greenspan 0.639  0.441  0.259  0.029  0.162  
  (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.48)  (0.51)  (0.53)  
Board member -1.011 ***   -1.039 *** -0.856 ***   
  (0.23)    (0.23)  (0.32)    
Experience -0.058 ** -0.058 ** -0.056 **     
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)      
Gender 0.876 *** 0.948 *** 0.880 *** 0.846 *** 0.950 *** 
  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.31)  (0.32)  
President‘s party   0.455 * 0.489 ** 0.495 ** 0.448 * 
    (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  
Dem bank president   0.329      0.421  
   (0.41)      (0.50)  
Rep bank president    1.027 ***     1.049 ** 
   (0.39)      (0.47)  
Rep governor   -0.329      -0.083  
   (0.40)      (0.45)  
National industrial production gap     -0.240  -0.280  -0.260  
      (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  
National inflation     -0.675 * -0.719 * -0.684 * 
     (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.39)  
Regional unemplyoment     -0.212  -0.092  -0.138  
      (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.17)  
Regional house price gap     -0.043  -0.031  -0.041  
      (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Academia       0.012  0.035  
       (0.02)  (0.03)  
Government       -0.058  -0.017  
       (0.06)  (0.07)  
Industry       -0.125 ** -0.105 * 
       (0.05)  (0.05)  
Finance       -0.023  -0.001  
       (0.02)  (0.03)  
NGO       -0.060  -0.059 * 
       (0.07)  (0.07)  
Board staff       0.002  0.017  
       (0.03)  (0.03)  
Fed bank staff       -0.015  0.008  
       (0.02)  (0.03)  
Constant -1.893 *** -2.557 *** -1.806 ** -2.230 *** -3.185 *** 
 (0.67)  (0.77)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.90)  
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Wald chi2 32.40 *** 40.29 *** 43.80 *** 43.29 *** 44.31 *** 
Penalized LogL -339.55  -331.07  -324.58  -287.99  -284.82  
No. of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  1796  
Note: Results from penalized maximum likelihood estimation (firthlogit estimation). Dependent variable: 
inconsistent vote. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
3.3.4. Results of the interaction models 
 
Since the baseline regressions indicate that 1993’s change in transparency directly affected 
inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC, by significantly reducing the probability that a 
FOMC member voted inconsistently, one may raise the question as to whether this circumstance 
also had a conditional effect for different groups on the committee. For example, in the 1989-
2008 period, Bank presidents and Board members showed clear differences in inconsistent 
voting behavior in the sense that Board members (male members) had a significantly lower 
probability of casting inconsistent votes than Bank presidents (female members) did. Likewise, 
FOMC members with less committee experience had a significantly higher likelihood of voting 
inconsistently, in comparison to those with more experience. Therefore, in the subsequent 
analysis it is asked if conditional effects shape inconsistent voting amongst different groups of 
FOMC members. For this, the Tape variable is interacted with member-specific characteristics 
(being a Board member or Bank president, gender, committee experience, career background 
before becoming a FOMC member, and political affiliation).  
 
Coefficient estimations of interaction models are provided in Table A 3.3 in the 
Appendix. Based on these estimations, marginal effects are calculated and presented below, 
whereas in Table 3.9 the Tape dummy is interacted with the Board member dummy, in Table 
3.10 the Tape dummy is interacted with the Gender dummy, and finally in Table 3.11 the Tape 
dummy is interacted with the President’s party dummy. The interaction effects of columns 2 
and 3 in Table 3.9-Table 3.11 represent the expected probability (marginal effect) of 
inconsistent voting between interacted dummy variables, whereas columns 4 and 5 represent 
differences in these marginal effects. For instance, being a Bank president (Board member) 
between 1989 and 1993 has a 13.5% (5.7%) probability of inconsistent voting. After the regime 
shift in transparency, the probability of inconsistent voting drops significantly to 7.1% for Bank 
presidents and to 2.5% for Board members. As already outlined, Bank presidents and Board 
members differ significantly with respect to their inconsistent voting behavior. For Bank 
presidents the probability of casting an inconsistent vote before (after) introducing the regime 
shift is 7.8 percentage points (4.5 percentage points) higher than for Board members.  
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Gender has, in fact, not only a direct effect but also a conditional effect when 
considering inconsistent voting behavior within the FOMC. Interestingly, the probability that a 
female member cast an inconsistent vote drops by 31.6 percentage points after 1993, whereas 
the probability for male members of casting an inconsistent vote remains relatively constant 
(dropping just by 2.2 percentage points). Apparently, voting behavior of male and female 
members converged greatly as a result of the decision to publish verbatim transcripts. 
 
TABLE 3.9: EXPECTED PROBABILITIES FROM INTERACTING BOARD AND TAPE DUMMIES 
 
Marginal effect Marginal effect 
Differences dy/dx 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
 Tape = 0 Tape = 1  Tape = 0 Tape = 1 
Bank 
presidents  
0.135 *** 
 
(0.03) 
  
0.071 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
Bank presidents - 
Board member 
0.078 ** 
 
(0.03) 
  
0.045 *** 
(0.01) 
 
Board member  
0.057 *** 
 
(0.02) 
  
0.025 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
 Bank president Board member 
   Tape (1) – Tape (0) 
-0.065 ** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.032 ** 
(0.02) 
 
 
TABLE 3.10: EXPECTED PROBABILITIES FROM INTERACTING GENDER AND TAPE DUMMIES 
 
Marginal effect Marginal effect 
Differences dy/dx 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
 Tape = 0 Tape = 1  Tape = 0 Tape = 1 
Male  
0.064 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
0.042 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
Male – Female 
-0.314 *** 
 
(0.10) 
  
-0.020  
(0.02) 
 
Female  
0.378 *** 
 
(0.10) 
  
0.062 *** 
 
(0.02) 
  
 Male Female 
   Tape (1) – Tape (0) 
-0.022  
(0.01) 
 
-0.316 *** 
(0.10) 
 
 
In order to test the conditional effect of the direct political influence channel, Table 3.11 
presents the results of interacting Tape and the President’s party dummy. FOMC members 
changed their views the most under the presidency of George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993 
(10.1%) and the least under the presidency of George W. Bush from 2001 to 2008 (2.4%). 
Under the presidency of Bill Clinton FOMC members changed their views on average by 7%. 
As it turns out, the probability of casting inconsistent votes decreases significantly over time 
confirming the results of the previous section. Moreover, the last column of Table 3.11 reveals 
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that under the presidency of Bill Clinton the probability of casting inconsistent votes was 
significantly higher (4.6 percentage points) than under the presidency of George W. Bush taking 
office in 2001. As a result, the Clinton – Greenspan period could be interpreted as being more 
consensus building oriented than the (G. W.) Bush – Greenspan and (G. W.) Bush – Bernanke 
periods, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.11: EXPECTED PROBABILITIES FROM INTERACTING PRESIDENT'S PARTY AND TAPE DUMMIES 
 
Marginal effect Marginal effect 
Differences dy/dx 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
 Tape = 0 Tape = 1  Tape = 0 Tape = 1 
Republican 
0.101 *** 
 
(0.02) 
  
0.024 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
Republican - 
Democratic 
0.084 *** 
 
(0.03) 
  
-0.046 *** 
(0.01) 
 
Democratic 
0.017  
 
(0.02) 
  
0.070 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
 Republican Democratic 
   Tape (1) – Tape (0) 
-0.077 ***  
(0.02) 
 
0.052 *** 
(0.02) 
 
Note: Table 3.9 – Table 3.11: Marginal effects represent the expected probability of the outcome being one 
(inconsistent voting) of a one unit change in the predictor (ceteris paribus) with respect to a certain cell. Delta-
Method standard errors are in parentheses. Covariates are held at their mean values. 
 
 As indicated by the baseline results, FOMC member having worked in different 
branches before becoming Bank president or Governor have a systematically different 
unconditional probability of casting inconsistent votes. This holds true especially for members 
with a career in industry having a significant lower probability of casting inconsistent votes 
than members without a career in industry.  
 
 Since career aspects may play a role in inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC, 
Figure 3.1 – Figure 3.8 show the marginal effects of interacting Tape with Experience gathered 
in FOMC meetings (Figure 3.1) and the individual career backgrounds before becoming FOMC 
member (Figure 3.2 – Figure 3.8), respectively. The x-axis of each figure shows the number of 
years of working experience relative to the committee’s mean value for the respective meeting. 
The y-axis of each figure shows the marginal effect of changing the Tape dummy value from 0 
to 1 on the probability of casting an inconsistent vote.  
 
For the interaction model using meeting Experience as the conditioning variable, Figure 
3.1 reveals that the difference in the marginal effect between periods of publishing (Tape = 1) 
and not publishing (Tape = 0) verbatim transcripts is negative and upward sloping. Significant 
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differences have been found for FOMC members with short experience in the committee. That 
is, after the change in transparency the probability of casting an inconsistent vote is significantly 
smaller for FOMC members with low experience. In other words, the more experienced a 
member, the smaller the difference between the pre-1993 and post-1993 periods (that is, 
significant differences in inconsistent voting behavior between members diminish with longer 
committee experience). Concerning career aspects, only Figure 3.3 shows clear 
interdependence between career background and the transparency shift in 1993 on the 
probability of voting inconsistently in the FOMC. The marginal effect (which tracks the impact 
of the regime shift) is negative and downward sloping, indicating a lower probability of casting 
inconsistent votes in the FOMC after 1993. This effect is more pronounced the longer a FOMC 
member has served in the government sector (relative to the mean of the committee) before 
becoming Bank president or Board member. For instance, take the example of a committee 
member who has worked 10 years more in the government sector relative to the average of the 
committee before becoming a Bank president or Board member. After the regime shift in 1993 
this member’s probability of casting an inconsistent vote is 0.5 percentage points lower than 
before the shift. Accordingly, FOMC members with a career in the government sector have 
been strongly affected by the regime shift in transparency. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND EXPERIENCE 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND ACADEMIA 
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FIGURE 3.3: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND GOVERNMENT 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND INDUSTRY 
 
 
FIGURE 3.5: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND FINANCE 
 
 
FIGURE 3.6: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND NGO 
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FIGURE 3.7: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND BOARD STAFF 
 
 
FIGURE 3.8: MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERACTING TAPE DUMMY AND FED BANK STAFF 
 
Note Figure 3.1- Figure 3.8: Solid lines display the difference of marginal effects between before and after the 
change in transparency on the probability of casting an inconsistent vote. Dashed lines display the 95% confidence 
intervals. The x-axis of each figure shows the number of years of working experience relative to the committee’s 
mean value for the respective meeting. The y-axis of each figure shows the marginal effect of switching from 0 to 
1 in the Tape dummy on the probability of casting an inconsistent vote. 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Using FOMC voting data extracted from verbatim transcripts from 1989 until 2008, I test 
several potential determinants influencing inconsistent voting behavior. Inconsistent voting 
behavior is defined as switching from dissenting in the policy go-around to assenting in the 
formal vote. It is hypothesized that the change in transparency in 1993 as well as individual 
characteristics of FOMC members may play a significant role in inconsistent voting behavior.  
 
Applying logit models, the results can be summarized as follows: The regime shift in 
transparency has a significant impact on the probability of casting inconsistent votes. After 
1993, the probability of casting inconsistent votes decreases significantly, on average by 3.3 
percentage points. FOMC members with longer experience on the committee have a lower 
probability of casting inconsistent votes. Further results suggest that Board members and Bank 
presidents (likewise, male and female members) differ significantly, with Bank presidents 
(female members) casting inconsistent votes more often than Board members (male members) 
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do. In addition, political aspects and individual career backgrounds also contribute to explaining 
inconsistent voting behavior.  
 
Conditional effects reveal that after the change in transparency, differences between 
Board members and Bank presidents remain, whereas differences between male and female 
members diminish. Further results suggest that FOMC members with a career in the 
government sector have been strongly affected by the regime shift in transparency. Finally, 
during the presidency of George W. Bush the probability of casting inconsistent votes in the 
FOMC was significantly lower than during the presidency of Bill Clinton. 
 
 From an international point of view it would be interesting to study a possible impact of 
transparency changes (and/or altering committee compositions) on the voting behavior, and 
especially on inconsistent voting, in other mayor central banks such as the MPC of the Bank of 
England25 or the European Central Bank. Indeed, the MPC recently announced that the Bank 
of England will publish written transcripts with a lag of eight years.26 In addition to that, the 
ECB also announced to publish minutes in the future. However, the publication lag is fixed to 
a period of 30 years.27 Thus, this paper provides not only a deeper insight of inconsistent voting 
behavior in the FOMC, but might also be used to derive possible determinants affecting 
inconsistent voting behavior in the MPC or in the Governing Council of the ECB.   
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The Warsh report (December 2014) suggests that the Bank of England’s MPC should release its written 
transcripts with a delay of five to ten years. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/spwarsh111214.pdf  
26 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2014/168.aspx 
27 https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Topics/2015/2015_02_19_ecb_accounts.html 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A 3.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Dependent variable 
 
Data sources 
 
 
Inconsistent vote FOMC member cast either an inconsistent vote (1), i.e. 
casting a dissent in the policy go-around and assenting 
in the formal vote; or cast a consistent vote (0) 
 
FOMC transcripts 
 
Regional variables 
  
Regional unemployment   - Difference between unemployment rate in district i 
and national unemployment rate 
- District unemployment rate is the weighted average of 
state-specific unemployment rates, population shares 
are used as the weighting scheme 
National and State 
Unemployment 
Rate: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Resident Population: 
Census Bureau 
Failed deposits of 
regional banks 
 Failed deposits of insolvent banks per capita in district 
i 
District failed deposits is the weighted average of price-
deflated state-specific failed deposits (district 
boundaries are taken from Chappell et al. (2008)), 
population shares are used as the weighting scheme 
Failed deposits: 
Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company 
 
Resident population: 
Census Bureau 
Consumer price 
index: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Regional coincident 
index 
 Index reflects current economic conditions in a state 
combining nonfarm payroll employment, average hours 
worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and 
wage and salary disbursements. The trend for each 
state’s index is set to the trend of its gross domestic 
product (GDP), so long-term growth in the state’s index 
matches long-term growth in its GDP. 
Index is used as month-over month percentage change. 
Difference between coincident index in voter i‘s district 
and national coincident index 
District coincident index is the weighted average of 
state-specific coincident indexes (district boundaries 
are taken from Chappell et al. (2008)), population 
shares are used as the weighting scheme 
 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia 
    
Regional house price 
gap 
 Percentage deviation of district i‘s house price index 
from time trend 
 
State-specific house price gap is calculated as 
percentage difference between state-specific house 
price index and Hodrick-Prescott-based time trend; 
smoothing parameter for the Hodrick-Prescott filter was 
set to 1,600; quarterly house price indexes are 
interpolated to monthly data using the cubic spline 
method 
District-specific house price gap is the weighted 
average of state-specific house price gaps (district 
boundaries are taken from Chappell et al. (2008)), 
population shares are used as the weighting scheme 
 
House price index 
for U.S. states: 
Federal Housing 
Finance Agency 
 
Resident population: 
Census Bureau 
 
  National variables  
53 
 
 
National industrial 
production gap 
 Percentage deviation of national industrial production 
index from Hodrick-Prescott-based time trend; 
smoothing parameter for the Hodrick-Prescott filter was 
set to 14,400 
Industrial 
Production: Board of 
Governors 
 
National inflation  Month-over-month percentage change in Consumer 
Price Index 
Consumer Price 
Index: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
National output gap Month-over-month change in Hodrick-Prescott-based 
output gap; smoothing parameter for the Hodrick-
Prescott filter was set to 1,600 
National output: 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
National unemployment   Month-over-month change in national unemployment 
rate  
National 
Unemployment 
Rate: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Federal funds rate Federal Funds Rate of the Wednesday prior to the 
FOMC meeting 
Federal Funds Rate: 
Board of Governors 
National house price gap Percentage deviation of national house price index from 
Hodrick-Prescott-based time trend; smoothing 
parameter for the Hodrick-Prescott filter was set to 
1,600; quarterly house price indexes are interpolated to 
monthly data using the cubic spline method 
House price index 
for the U.S.: Federal 
Housing Finance 
Agency 
National Commodity price 
index 
Quarter-over-quarter percentage change in S&P GSCI 
Commodity Spot Price Index 
S&P GSCI, drawn 
from Datastream 
   
National Exchange rate 
index 
Quarter-over-quarter percentage change in trade 
weighted nominal dollar exchange rate index; higher 
values indicate depreciation of the U.S. dollar 
Federal Reserve, 
drawn from 
Datastream 
Recession Dummy variable; equals 1 if U.S. economy turns into 
recession, 0 otherwise 
The Econbrowser 
Recession Indicator 
Index 
 
Institutional dummy variables 
 
 
Board member Dummy variable; equals 1 if vote cast by Board 
member, 0 if vote cast by Bank president 
 
Tape Dummy variable indicating the date since all committee 
members were aware that the FOMC meetings have 
been tape recorded; equals 1 from 1993M11 thru 
2008M12 and 0 otherwise 
FOMC voting 
minutes (November, 
16 1993) 
Meeting Dummy variable; equals 1 if vote cast at face-to-face 
meeting, 0 if vote cast via conference call 
 
Greenspan Dummy variable; equals 1 if FOMC chairman is Alan 
Greenspan, 0 otherwise; reference category is the 
chairmanship of Ben Bernanke 
 
Gender Dummy variable; equals 1 if FOMC member is female, 
0 otherwise 
 
 
Individual career experience 
 
 
Experience  Number of years FOMC member has worked as 
committee member  
Own calculations 
Career background in 
Academia, Government, 
Industry, Finance, NGO, 
Board of Governors, 
Federal Reserve Bank  
 
Number of years FOMC member has worked in a full 
time position in the respective sector before becoming 
Bank president or Board membermember minus mean 
committee value  
Own calculations 
  
Political affiliation through appointment dummies 
 
 
Dem governor  
Dummy variable equals 1 if Federal Reserve Board 
member was appointed by Democratic President; 0 
otherwise 
Own calculations 
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Rep governor 
Dummy variable equals 1 if Federal Reserve Board 
member was appointed by Republican President; 0 
otherwise 
Own calculations 
Dem bank president 
Dummy variable equals 1 if Federal Reserve Bank 
president was elected during Democratic presidency; 0 
otherwise 
Own calculations 
Rep bank president 
Dummy variable equals 1 if Federal Reserve Bank 
president was elected during Republican presidency; 0 
otherwise 
 
Own calculations 
 
Political pressure dummy 
 
 
President‘s party Dummy variable equals 1 if current President of the 
United States is Democratic; 0 otherwise 
Own calculations 
 
TABLE A 3.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ALL DETERMINANTS 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Regional house price gap  0.011 2.342 -9.926 12.527 
Regional coincident index 0.129 0.887 -2.662 2.700 
Failed deposits of regional banks 6.130 37.163 0 1039.192 
Regional unemployment  -0.129 0.687 -2.246 1.813 
National unemployment  0.004 0.146 -0.400 0.500 
National inflation 0.244 0.255 -1.803 0.950 
National output gap -0.044 0.548 -2.405 1.140 
National house price gap 0.199 2.112 -4.162 5.552 
Federal funds rate 4.440 2.162 0.130 9.860 
National Commodity price index 0.063 5.624 -13.086 19.845 
National exchange rate index 0.218 1.201 -3.256 3.394 
Recession 0.188 0.391 0 1 
Board member 0.547 0.500 0 1 
Tape 0.766 0.424 0 1 
Meeting 0.967 0.180 0 1 
Gender 0.131 0.338 0 1 
Greenspan 0.859 0.349 0 1 
Experience 5.282 4.600 0 23 
Academia 0.787 9.356 -9.65 25.111 
Government 0.467 3.000 -2.294 10.167 
Industry 1.328 9.512 -4.5 27.895 
Finance 0.679 9.085 -7.706 29.444 
NGO 0.342 3.151 -2.118 23.263 
Board staff 0.203 4.984 -2.526 27.111 
Fed bank staff -2.809 8.343 -9.059 24.889 
Dem governor 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Rep governor 0.413 0.493 0 1 
Dem bank president 0.164 0.370 0 1 
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Rep bank president 0.289 0.453 0 1 
President’s party 0.394 0.489 0 1 
 
TABLE A 3.3: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION MODELS 
Variable Model               
  I  II  III  IV  
Tape -0.753 ** -0.470 * -1.584 *** -0.923 ** 
  (0.31)  (0.26)  (0.37)  (0.46)  
Board member -0.983 ** -1.192 *** -1.029 *** -1.068 *** 
 (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.23)  
Tape*Board member -0.107        
 (0.47)        
Meeting -0.121  -0.114  -0.135  -0.120  
  (0.67)  (0.65)  (0.69)  (0.67)  
Greenspan 0.338  0.342  -0.177  0.322  
  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.65)  (0.57)  
Experience -0.058 * -0.062 ** -0.046  -0.078  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.08)  
Tape*Experience       0.026  
       (0.08)  
Gender 0.877 *** 2.351 *** 0.931 *** 0.885 *** 
  (0.28)  (0.52)  (0.29)  (0.28)  
Tape*Gender   -1.922 ***     
   (0.61)      
President‘s party 0.505 ** 0.487 ** -1.923 * 0.519 ** 
  (0.21)  (0.22)  (1.05)  (0.22)  
Tape*President’s party     3.078 ***   
     (1.11)    
National industrial production gap -0.242  -0.248  -0.215  -0.243  
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  
National inflation -0.650 * -0.665 * -0.788 ** -0.651 * 
  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35)  
Regional unemplyoment -0.212  -0.244  -0.280 * -0.208  
  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  
Regional house price gap -0.045  -0.044  -0.066  -0.047  
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Constant -2.041 ** -2.176 ** -1.248  -1.903 ** 
 (0.88)  (0.85)  (0.90)  (0.95)  
Pseudo R2 0.06  0.08  0.08  0.06  
Wald chi2 56.06 *** 68.45 *** 60.38 *** 57.56 *** 
LogL -345.11  -340.18  -337.55  -345.06    
PCP (%) 94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  
EPCP (%) 90.37  90.45  90.49  90.38  
No of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  
56 
 
TABLE A 3.4: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION MODELS, CONT’D 
Variable Model               
  V  VI  VII  VIII  
Tape -0.948 *** -0.739 *** -0.928 *** -0.751 *** 
  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.40)  (0.24)  
Board member -1.207 *** -1.060 *** -0.706 *** -0.918  
 (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.66)  
Meeting -0.032  -0.107  -0.090  -0.116  
  (0.66)  (0.68)  (0.66)  (0.66)  
Greenspan 0.285  0.338  -0.016  0.374  
  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.59)  (0.57)  
Gender 1.134 *** 0.871 *** 0.679 ** 0.962 *** 
  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
President‘s party 0.535 ** 0.537 ** 0.490 ** 0.508 ** 
  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  
National industrial production gap -0.241   -0.301  -0.275  -0.258  
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  
National inflation -0.615 * -0.673 * -0.681 * -0.656 * 
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.35)  (0.35)  
Regional unemplyoment -0.272  -0.141  -0.178  -0.174  
  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.16)  
Regional house price gap -0.061  -0.030  -0.024  -0.028  
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  
Academia -0.001        
 (0.02)        
Tape*Academia 0.057 **       
 (0.02)        
Government   0.270 **     
   (0.11)      
Tape*Government   -0.488 ***     
   (0.13)      
Industry     -0.128 **   
     (0.06)    
Tape*Industry     -0.044    
     (0.10)    
Finance       -0.034  
       (0.02)  
Tape*Finance       0.027  
       (0.03)  
Constant -2.332 *** -2.420 *** -2.350 *** -2.445 *** 
 (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.91)  (0.86)  
Pseudo R2 0.08  0.09  0.09  0.06  
Wald chi2 79.95 *** 73.51 *** 47.63 *** 58.37 *** 
LogL -338.42  -335.04  -335.79  -346.25  
PCP (%) 94.77  94.77  94.77  94.77  
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EPCP (%) 90.42  90.50  90.41  90.35  
No of Obs 1796  1796  1796  1796  
 
TABLE A 3.5: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION MODELS, CONT’D II 
Variable Model           
  IX  X  XI  
Tape -0.567  -0.834 *** -0.802 *** 
  (0.42)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
Board member -0.774 *** -0.936 *** -0.777 *** 
 (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.29)  
Meeting -0.144  -0.110  -0.120  
  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.67)  
Greenspan 0.360  0.359  0.352  
  (0.56)  (0.58)  (0.56)  
Gender 0.950 *** 1.007 *** 0.935 *** 
  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.30)  
President‘s Party 0.487 ** 0.533 ** 0.523 ** 
  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  
National industrial production gap -0.251  -0.252  -0.254  
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  
National inflation -0.635 * -0.625 * -0.652 * 
  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.19)  
Regional unemployment -0.134  -0.225  -0.208  
  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  
Regional house price gap -0.030  -0.031  -0.028  
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
NGO -1.090      
 (1.09)      
Tape*NGO 0.910      
 (1.09)      
Board staff   0.059    
   (0.16)    
Tape*Board staff   -0.038    
   (0.16)    
Fed bank staff     0.024  
     (0.02)  
Tape*Fed bank staff     -0.017  
     (0.02)  
Constant -2.673 *** -2.395 *** -2.434 *** 
 (0.93)  (0.87)  (0.86)  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.06  0.06  
Wald chi2 56.85 *** 54.46 *** 56.69 *** 
LogL -342.33  -347.04  -346.97  
PCP (%) 94.77  94.77  94.77  
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EPCP (%) 90.38  90.34  90.34  
No of Obs 1796  1796  1796  
Note: Results from pooled logit model estimation. Dependent variable: inconsistent vote. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
